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Totalitarianisms as systems of lawlessness  
(Miłosz’s remarks)
“Starting from unlimited freedom, 
I conclude with unlimited despotism.”
(Fyodor Dostoevsky, Demons)
Gnostic freedom
miłosz’s remarks on freedom have a biographical foundation. Already in his 
youth in Vilnius, the most important dimension of the experience of freedom 
for him was existence. miłosz was not interested in the nation’s liberty. In his 
poetry and articles, he wrote with the fervour of a revolutionary, yet the rebellion 
against social and economic inequality was for him just an ersatz for contest-
ing specific existences. In “List do obrońców kultury”, published in Po prostu 
in 1936, he expressed his scepticism towards the marxist project of mending the 
world: “Had I opposed the system because I felt solidarity with the mass of the 
defective, I would be lying.”1 Young miłosz was, in fact, rebelliously opposing 
the timeless markers of the human place in the world. Being overcome with the 
desire for existence without any limitations, and driven by his longing for in-
finitude, he craved a superhuman state, and since the human condition cannot 
achieve in earthly existence a godly superhuman nature, his freedom-focussed 
yes correlated with the exorbitant Prime – as reflected in his poetry and essays – 
transitioned into an eschatological no against the world enveloped in apocalyptic 
visions of the final extermination. The imperative of total freedom transitioned 
logically into a total rebellion – as extreme yes changes into absolute no because 
 * Dr hab. prof. UG, e-mail: kazmierczykzb@wp.pl; Department of Literatury History, Institu-
te of Polish Philology, University of Gdansk, 80-952 Gdańsk, 55 Wita Stwosza street.
 1 Cz. miłosz, “List do obrońców kultury”, in idem, Przygody młodego umysłu. Publicystyka 
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on the reverse side of freedom, as Camus posited, there is rebellion.2 We can call 
that rebellious and vengeful freedom gnostic. It evokes the most extreme meta-
physical contestation. It far exceeds in its radical nature the versions of rebellion 
defined by Albert Camus in The Rebel. If the sons of Prometheus and Cain turn 
against evil Gods, they are, in fact, for them, Rulers of the world worth saving 
– worth the fire of progress and supposed justice. Only the rebellion shown by 
Byron did not fit Camus’s typology, as for Cain in the mystery play of the English 
Romantic the Earth is not worth life but extermination. His claims against God as 
the cosmic botcher are gnostic (Marcionistic) and Manichaeistic. Among Slavs, 
the fullest presentation of Byronic folly was presented by, close in that respect to 
miłosz, Fyodor Dostoevsky. A similar freedom from the entanglement of Earthly 
existence, and the resulting rebellion were shared by the persona of the poetry, 
prose, and essays of the Nobel Prize winner. His autobiographical Three Winters, 
and his pre-WWII essays were a record of his desire for freedom from any bod-
ily or material limitations as being temporal and mortal, searches for freedom 
from interpersonal relations due to their limiting nature. Escapism and contempt 
for community as a biologised mass are characteristic of miłosz’s statements. 
That aversion is inevitable when freedom demands existence outside earthly time 
and space, when yes applies only to the existence of the Prime: on another Earth 
and under a different sky.
Breakaway freedom
Gnostic freedom creates a division between the hell of the world and the 
heaven of the after-world. That anti-worldly separation was considered by, e.g. 
Dostoevsky, Nikolai Berdyaev, and Bogumił Jasinowski as the algorithm of the 
Russian vision of the world and man. miłosz discovered it in himself as the East-
ern particle.3 Through it he possessed a sense of kinship with eastern cultists 
and religious thinkers. The eastern cult dualism imposes a vision of the world as 
a valley of death ruled by Satan, the Prince of This World. He defined an image of 
 2 Vide: A. Camus, “Człowiek zbuntowany”, in idem, Eseje, selection and trans. J. Guze, 
Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warsaw 1971, p. 265. At the foundation of metaphysical rebel-
lion, according to Camus, lies the total yes in the name of which the rebel says no to the whole 
world and the human fate anticipated in it: “The metaphysical rebel rises to demand unity for the 
broken world. (…) By protesting against the human condition, against that which remains unfin-
ished by death and broken by evil, the metaphysical rebellion is a justified demand of a joyful unity 
against the suffering of life and death.” (ibid., p. 278). [English version translated from Polish]. 
miłosz considered gnostic contestation demands as unfounded. That turn resulted in the crisis of 
his gnostic individualism.
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man as a soul bound by the body and matter. That duality is also eschatological. 
It bears apocalyptic longing – a desire for the end of the evil world. That was why 
Berdyaev considered Russians as naturally apocalyptic souls and, in relation to 
that terminal temperament, nihilistic towards worldliness. miłosz accepted that 
diagnosis. In Native Realm (1958) particularly he emphasised that the anti-world-
ness of the gnostic dualism towards worldliness implies nihilism. He offered 
examples that the fallen world is not worth engaging in for a dualist, fulfilling 
positive postulates, and sacrifice in defence of the socially accepted axiological 
order. The experienced good does not deserve any gratitude from a nihilist. It 
vanishes in the void of insatiation. miłosz, similarly to Albert Camus, stressed 
that that nihilism was religious, not atheistic. He posited, mainly after Jasinowski 
and Berdyaev, possibly under the influence of The Russian Idea (1946), that Rus-
sian nihilism was apocalyptic, or, even more precisely, that it was a nihilism of 
gnostic eschatology.
Redemptive freedom
It is worth noticing that gnostic freedom is a freedom of extremely individu-
alistic religiosity: one which despises the world, and longs for its end. That free-
dom does not want to have anything to do with religious orthodoxy, or any form 
of a collective cult. It discovers an unknown God, foreign to others. It considers 
that discovery as being redemptive. Thus, the freedom is a freedom of self-re-
demption. A dualist cannot lose it, because they would lose redemption. Because 
their freedom is the freedom to redeem themselves, they would have to abandon 
their belief in self-redemption to depart from gnostic freedom. Since the essence 
of their belief is obstinate, i.e. belief in the self by the self being redeemed, they 
remain just as obstinate by their absolute freedom as a guarantee of the choice of 
gnosis. Religious free-thinking opens a follower to heretic beliefs and religious 
ideas. Through that openness, the gnostic individualist finds redemption through 
a reinterpretation of faith. It is based on dark theophany, discovering that exist-
ence is wrong as it is ruled by an evil demiurge. The Good God has nothing 
in common with the demiurge’s creation. He remains in an acosmic space as 
deus otiosus. The extreme nature of religious individualism appears precisely in 
a dualist’s openness to heretical ideas as the components of redemptive gnosis. 
A significant feature of miłosz’s religiosity was his common inclusion of Slavic 
syncretism – adopting the heretical ideas of the religion of gnosis.
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Gnostic freedom as fate
In gnostic freedom, the power of the contestation of worldliness is the power 
of one’s desire for a world not as it is, but as it should be. Freedom which says yes 
to the world it desires, demands immortality in contrast to that which is mortal, it 
is a desire of the timelessness contrary to that which is temporal, it is fuelled by 
the unifying desire for self-redemption contrary to wasting life in everyday loi-
tering, finally, it is a desire for godliness contrary to the status of Eve’s exiles on 
the wretched Earth. That is the essence of the predominance of gnostic freedom. 
Motivated by the desire for immortality, accessing timelessness, belief in self-
redemption, and godliness, it becomes fate. It is the freedom of galley slaves to 
existential sensitivity. It is constantly lurking. It is intended. The act of realising it 
is like revealing predestination. It is a burden and a curse which, as in the case of 
miłosz, the galley slave sometimes tries to escape through abandoning the desires 
for immortality, timelessness, self-redemption, and godliness. Gnostic freedom 
discovers it is a slave to selfishness, which makes it subject to usurpation, and 
the supporting operations of a speculative mind. It realises that it is the subject 
of a contrived self-redemption. It is a freedom of the necessary, i.e. involuntary 
taking redemption into one’s own hands. The religious individualist discovers 
that they are slaves to their religious wilfulness. Its strength lies in one’s selfishly 
ensuring one’s eternal life. It is a freedom of a personality subject to solipsism all 
the way to egolatry. They realise that the freedom is the freedom of a demigod on 
Earth, and that is their tragedy as they discover that their freedom is hostage to 
the image their demigodness.
The tragedy of having realised the temptations of anthropotheism was dis-
cussed in miłosz’s essays before WWII, and it remained a persevering theme in 
his later collections of essays, novels, and poetry.
The freedom-necessity opposition
The division between the world and the after-world prime (the gnostic Pl-
eroma) means a separation, and a transition to a binary opposition system of two 
dimensions: the realm of worldly necessities and escapist freedom. Bogumił Ja-
sinowski, after Nikolai Berdyaev who authored Dostoevsky: An Interpretation, 
wrote “the sense of the division into reality and perfection, or even a type of 
delight in internal contradiction and psychological disharmony”, and considered 
“the psychological disposition, specific for the Russian nature” as the most impor-
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tant4. A specialist on Russia, he stressed the enormity of the Slavic ideal: “We 
need to add a word or two of explanation in relation to the thesis of the duality of 
the after-world perfection, and worldliness within the mental history of Byzan-
tium, and later Russia. That duality, as discussed above, is contrary to freedom 
or necessity, contrary to individual consciousness, immortal and godly, and the 
society-state bond, bad and necessary.”5
The enormously inbred (and thus split) will of a dualist, who wishes to con-
trol only themselves – not the will of God, state, society, the obligations of tradi-
tion and customs – inevitably and painfully enters into conflict with that which is 
not theirs. That which is not their own seems necessary. In the gnostic experience 
of freedom, that which is necessary is not only incidental, but mostly it is associ-
ated with the timeless flaws of the body and matter. Gnostic freedom manifests its 
opposition towards their decay, stench, senility, atrophy, ergo: mortalisation. That 
freedom is also irritated by such obligations (necessities) of the body as: satisfy-
ing hunger, thirst, need of warmth, and, most of all, sexual drive. The experience 
of gnostic freedom expressed in miłosz’s works was peculiar for its consideration 
of the everyday needs of primitive man as an unbearable thrall.
Because an anti-worldly dualist enters into conflict with those needs, they 
even more so experience their power, which they considered a sign of superhuman 
tyranny. Thus split, they radiate the experience of the necessity onto the figure of 
the Creator as a tyrant, an evil demiurge. Given to existence, they are for gnostic 
freedom an insult, and a source of permanent dissension. Unbound in its struggle 
with the necessities of the body and matter, it achieves the antipodes of contesta-
tion. The sensory body is the enemy of a gnostic, and leads to a division with the 
spirit as a body of drives taking freedom onto a lead of necessity. It evokes disgust 
because it is a prison for freedom. It would be difficult to imagine a more extreme 
duality of the spirit and the body than that in the gnostic experience of freedom in 
the shackles of innate rules. Therefore, the whole nature seems to a gnostic dualist 
as demiurgic, subject to a material cycle of birth, copulation, and death.
The principle gnostic freedom discovered in nature is the eternal devouring 
of beings. As proof of the demiurgic character of nature, that freedom delights 
in the image of nature as carnage. Therefore, when a gnostic dualist finds for 
their world-view structure an anti-naturalist ideology, they become a fanatic. The 
belief in the new order is their belief in themselves. They will rather die than 
abandon it. When they hold the means of state-sanctioned enforcement, they will 
unleash terror, and will develop a world of planned and mechanical extermination 
unknown to nature. They become what they had fought.
 4 B. Jasinowski, Wschodnie chrześcijaństwo a Rosja. Na tle rozbioru pierwiastków cywiliza-
cyjnych Wschodu i Zachodu, Instytut Naukowo-Badawczy Europy Wschodniej, Vilnius 1933, p. 4. 
[English version translated from Polish].
 5 Ibid., p. 7.
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Crisis of gnostic freedom
The division between exorbitant freedom, and life’s necessities leads to a cri-
sis of gnostic consciousness. In miłosz’s autobiographical creations, it was a crisis 
of gnostic voluntarism. It was most visible before WWII in the essays O milcze-
niu, Zejście na ziemię, Radość i poezja, Dystans spojrzenia6. They were filled 
with anxiety resulting from miłosz’s realisation of the temptations of gnostic 
freedom as wilfulness. Their author already understood that the power of gnostic 
freedom is destructive. When nihilistically turned against the world, it destroys 
the worldly life of its carrier. That apocalyptic freedom is, in relation to worldli-
ness, capable of wilfulness’s extravagance. Social ideology is not a remedy to 
its existential whims. In Zejście na ziemię (1938), the author stated the fiasco of 
the transition from gnostic freedom under the banner of Marxist historic neces-
sities. He demanded freedom to develop from the position of calling for godli-
ness against passing and death, but he already understood the folly of a terrific 
contestation of the world. He discovered the barrenness of the earth presented to 
man who does not want to mend the world, but rather strives for final redemption 
from it. He understood that the freedom to escape from the world is an invertive 
freedom, turning into its opposite of acquiescence towards the ideology of life’s 
necessities. The author reported on his realisation that the result of the inability 
to immanently reconcile mortality with the body and matter is associated with 
aversion, disgust, and resentment towards reality. Therefore, he declared in his 
psychological plan the intent to restrain his megalopsychological rebelliousness. 
In his metaphysical plan, he declared his coming to terms with mortality, with 
the “Eve’s exile” condition, declaring his ability to accept the conditions of exist-
ence as given for earthly self-fulfilment. In his imagination, he passed the gates 
of death like Faustus as it is a trial of hell releasing him from the pestering fear 
of mortal life. “Descends to the bottom of hell on Earth, and travels those circles 
of fire flickering like the furnaces of Westphalia, untouched by the flames.”7 In 
an essay Radość i poezja (1939), he considered becoming accustomed to death 
and evil as a condition for becoming accustomed to life, i.e. a condition on which 
one’s ability to accept the limitations of existence depends. It is a condition for 
the ability to suppress the gnostic contestation of the world – to prevent the free-
dom from, and its transition into freedom to. The author of the pre-WWII essays, 
having identified an existential thorn, or husk of dualism between man and his 
life, no longer wanted to deaden its pricking with a substitute political rebellion. 
He wished to solve that problem there where it had been born, i.e. within the ex-
 6 Vide: Cz. miłosz, Przygody młodego umysłu…
 7 Cz. miłosz, “Radość i poezja”, in: idem, Przygody młodego umysłu…, p. 281.
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istential plan by raising himself for accepting its elemental data. He rejected the 
domain of political necessities in the name of freedom measured by the awareness 
of the folly of wilfulness – in the name of positive existential freedom. He under-
stood that positive freedom requires an agora, yet it does not have to be a forum 
for political activity. It can be apolitical art and culture. They did not require the 
artist to conceal the marks of godliness, and, at the same time, enabled him to pay 
tribute to necessity, though not for the price of adapting freedom to the require-
ments for accepting collective ideologies.
Since existential thorns include: a multitude of realities thwarting the ful-
filment of the desire for the Unity, the diffusion of the destructive imperative 
of the Entirety, and the confusing of the defiling spirit of Purity of the subject 
consciousness, one must acquire an ability to adapt the order to the I of the Only, 
the Entire, and the Pure the trials not – I of chaos here and now, which threatens 
with multitude, diffusion, confusion, but enables one to be victorious in that trial, 
and continue to regain the verified: Unity, Entirety, Purity – check être (eternal) 
within the crucible of devenir (variable).
Obduracy of the antinomy of freedom and necessity
miłosz’s pre-WWII attempts at reconciling freedom and necessity were of 
a declarative nature. The destructive wilfulness sought a bridle for itself. The 
concocted affirmation of necessity was of a temporary nature. It consisted of 
a rational pragmatism, which, however, did not neutralise outbursts of gnostic 
freedom. It offered hope of a unity of contradictory elements (coincidentia op-
positorum). Before WWII, the issue of freedom and necessity became the tragedy 
of the I of the Only. The poet developed his imperative of sensible acceptance of 
necessity. In eroticism, as opposed to ascetism, he sometimes was a libertine – 
a fickle indulgence for the body as the nest of drives that cannot be curtailed. In 
his relationship with Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, the master of the craft, there existed 
a visible submissiveness in their letters – years later referred to by miłosz himself 
as kolanopokłonność [knee-bowing]. In war-time reality, that pragmatism, burst-
ing as a result of the history revealing the demiurgic terror, transformed into the 
cynicism of professing the necessity of Hegel and Engels. He needed the aegis 
of a simplified anti-personal doctrine. Influenced by Taduesz Kroński, miłosz 
readily considered that freedom was realised necessity. He combined Darwinism 
with the philosophy of history under the banner of historic necessities creating an 
original biological philosophy of history. Through a Hegelian initiation, he found 
himself in opposition to the resistance, and to the totalitarian authorities after 
WWII, as that which exists is intelligent, and intelligence is shared only by that 
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which has the power to exist, and becomes victorious. miłosz, having discovered 
the necessity to subject his will to the rules of nature in order to establish bear-
able relations with reality, transferred that rationalism about history – considered 
in the light of Hegelianism as a set of processes both inevitable and intelligent. 
However, just like marxism before WWII, in the years after WWII, particularly 
after emigrating in 1951, he was fighting Hegelianism as an ideology legitimising 
Soviet colonialism. In the following decades of his American exile, he rejected 
Hegelianism not as much within its historical dimension, as in the existential and 
metaphysical plan as a school of legitimising the necessity of scientism making 
Earth a materialistic Ulro.
Totalitarian wilfulness
Free will within the folly of wilfulness remained the central focus of miłosz’s 
consideration of the roots of totalitarianism. Before WWII, the discord between 
freedom and worldly necessities became his view of the European mind in the 
age of quasi-religious ideologies. His biographical experiences brought the poet 
a conviction of the danger of captivity as a result of escaping from freedom both 
when a human being strives for the world, as they may succumb to the perni-
cious submissiveness towards the institutions of the totalitarian state, and when 
they escape from the world, as that may be forced and destructive escapism – re-
sulting from their inability to consider related existences as their own. Nihilism 
coupled with cynicism can, in that instance, suggest far-reaching compromises 
with the necessity to cause historic evil – for example, to justify the necessity of 
terror. miłosz was desperate to find a remedy for the scandals of gnostic wilful-
ness, yet his alliances with social and historic necessities (“New Faiths”) proved 
to be inefficient attempts at overcoming the escapist from. Due to his problems 
with freedom, he became a thorough analyst of it. He shaped his searches in the 
form of literary works. He considered them as laboratory studies, and himself 
as a research tool. Just like Romantics, he treated his biography according to the 
principle of pars pro toto. He considered how freedom led in the 20th c. to the folly 
of wilfulness as a method of looking into himself. He analysed the sicknesses of 
freedom in the West from a greater distance. Its eastern distortions were as close 
to him as his own shirt.
The criticism of the denegerations of freedom in the West conducted by miłosz 
was close to that of mickiewicz within the aspect of secularisation of beliefs and 
religious ideas. The Polish Romantic, e.g. in Księgi narodu polskiego i pielgr-
zymstwa polskiego, related freedom to monotheism, and captivity to secular poly-
theism. He argued that in modern Europe, the role of God was played by the calves 
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of secular values. He considered that polytheism to be modern neo-paganism. He 
thought that it led towards substituting God with God-man. miłosz noticed that the 
Darwinian principle of the fight for existence between the stronger and the weaker 
had become a dogma considered as a modern fetish within European thought. It 
served as a basis for decreeing the confrontational nature of human reality, and 
elevated the will to fight to the top of all values. miłosz concluded that the con-
tamination of Darwinism with the national ideology fertilised Nazism, while the 
Enlightenment’s anthropology of the naturally good man gave rise to communism. 
Even before WWII, he sought intellectual foundation for the etiologies of totali-
tarianisms. In an essay entitled Dystans spojrzenia (1939), he considered natural-
istic monism and Enlightenment humanism as their roots: “Theoreticians, closely 
examining those murky waters of 20th century consciousness, are pessimists, and 
they’re entitled to that. Some see the causes of evil in the detachment of ethics from 
its metaphysical basis, within the legacy of positivism and naturalism, attempting 
to reduce the phenomenon of the spirit to the category of time-space phenom-
ena, and thus to negate the difference between human and animal nature (Kozak, 
Chévalier). Others in an excessively bright humanism…”8
The author of Legendy nowoczesności, written during an occupation night, 
argued that capitalism gave Europeans a new form of individualism. It subordi-
nated their innovativeness to the lust for money. Having been seduced by its pow-
er, they stopped living according to a will subject to God’s will. They subjected 
their freedom to mercantile goals. miłosz considered that will for wealth as the 
modern equivalent of megalomania. Free-market democracy proved, according 
to the essayist, its incubator. He considered that megalomania as the blind will 
to magnify a unitary being and communities at the cost of others. In the capital-
ist law of absolute competition distorted in colonialism, he saw the kernel of the 
ideology of racial domination. In his eyes, capitalism associated market freedom 
with the will for financial power. In essence, capitalism legalised the right to fight 
for one’s existence. Balzac’s achievement was that he indicated the legalisation 
of the principle of the survival of the fittest, according to which the stronger in-
dividuals devour the weaker ones. The author of the essay Legenda miasta pot-
wora9 (1942) valued Balzac mainly for his bold analogy of the natural world and 
the world of economics.
According to miłosz, Stendhal in The Red and the Black presented that same 
process of the cult of will for power in the capitalist struggle for existence in the 
form of the god of career. That modern deity lured Julian Sorel to the expanse of 
permissivism. He associated freedom with the will for achieving social rank – 
 8 Cz. miłosz, “Dystans spojrzenia”, in: idem, Przygody młodego umysłu…, pp. 292–293. [En-
glish version translated from Polish].
 9 Vide: Cz. miłosz, “Legenda miasta potwora”, in idem, Legendy nowoczesności, Wydawni-
ctwo Literackie, Krakow 1996, p. 18.
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regardless whether within a church (black) or military (red) hierarchy. “However, 
both Stendhal’s and the readers’ sympathies lie with the protagonist.”10 That sym-
pathy was considered by miłosz as an expression of western nihilism. In his eyes, 
the fetishisation of money and career detached European rationalism from ethics. 
Without it, the rationalism of social Darwinism became dangerously irrational. 
The essayist’s argument was: where the mind falls asleep, there the demons of 
capitalist and colonial voluntarism awake. The will of the European eventually 
detached from religion as the axiological foundation. That European irrationalism 
of the liberated will, born from pragmatism, reached its peak in the work by An-
dre Gide entitled The Vatican Cellars. miłosz devoted an essay to the transition 
from the European will to total wilfulness with the telling title Zupełne wyzwole-
nie [Total liberation] (1942 ?). The actions of the protagonist in Gide’s novel were 
framed within the categories of necessity and freedom: “Lafcadio threw an old 
man he did not know out of a speeding train – he had no goal there, the crime will 
not benefit him in any way. He did that to find out whether ‘act gratuit’ was possi-
ble, i.e. an act independent of any determinants, the higher proof of man’s absolute 
freedom. (…) All those instances consisted of idolisation of will, and all the cases 
were founded on the obsession of necessity. (…) Suppressed resentment exploded 
in a rebellion against necessity, seeking at least an illusion of freedom.”11 In the 
essays Legenda woli (1942 ?) and Zupełne wyzwolenie, he argued that in phi-
losophy, wilfulness had been sanctioned in the writings of Frederich Nietzsche. 
Considering his interest in the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, which he ex-
pressed in an essay entitled Religijność Zdziechowskiego (1943), one ought to note 
that miłosz regarded as his own view the fact that the will which exists in nature 
and human history of one being to dominate other beings had led the philosopher 
to dark pessimism. Schopenhauer considered that will as a burden difficult to 
carry. His position towards human nature was critical rather than affirmative. He 
postulated man should remain self-critical towards blind will, not self-affirmative. 
Zdziechowski, who offered lectures on Schopenhauer’s philosophy and discussed 
it in Pesymizm, romantyzm a podstawy chrześcijaństwa, regarded blind will as 
an equivalent of a gnostic demiurge. miłosz, familiar with the theses of the author 
of the study The World As Will and Representation, considered the inversion of 
the notion of blind will as the essence of Nietzsche’s philosophical revolution. He 
presented the philosopher as the one who nullified the blind predicate to be substi-
tuted with power. Thus, he definitely liberated will from the harness of Christian 
axiology. After Nietzsche: “thus is the procedure of ‘strong man’: prove to her-
self/himself her/his own freedom, own unlimited ability. Human deeds are deter-
mined through a chain of causes. I remain under the burden of the fatal nature of 
 10 Cz. miłosz, “Legenda woli”, in idem, Legendy nowoczesności…, p. 43.
 11 Ibid.
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the social machine, yet I – I am free, and I can do that for which I can find cour-
age, overcoming my smallness, fear, and emotion.”12 miłosz presented Nietzsche 
as an opposer of Christian traditions inspired by Darwinism, who bereaved will 
of any moral inhibitions. He adored will for its power. He also brought to heights 
of sacred axioms the principle of self-affirmation of the instinctive side of human 
personality. He agreed with Lev Shestov, who juxtaposed Nietzsche with Dosto-
evsky as the prophet of the coming totalitarianisms in the work Dostojewski i Ni-
etzsche. Filozofia tragedii. According to miłosz, “Nietzsche, by calling: ‘Pereat 
veritas, fiat vita’ – may the truth perish, may there be life – cast a spell, which 
explained almost the entire intellectual ferment of the last century.”13 By rejecting 
the criterion of the truth, the German philosopher proclaimed a new voluntarism 
to Europe and the world: who cares whether it is blind, if it is the will of superhu-
man power. He disdained the truth, which in turn ousted European freedom to the 
antipodes of Nazi madness. During his French exile, miłosz agreed with Camus 
in that Nietzscheanism was a sign of the malady of the European mind, and an 
important root of the race totalitarianism. For the Polish poet, it was obvious as he 
considered that Darwinism was the common denominator of the philosophy and 
ideology of Nazism – the enforcement of blind will of superhumans to dominate 
sub-humans.
Philosophy of wilfulness
When in America, miłosz focussed on Dostoevsky, and found in him 
a prophet, who offered the most insightful vision of the outcomes of the European 
degeneration of freedom into wilfulness, who saw in the Western and Eastern 
wilfulness a degeneration of freedom leading to totalitarianisms. He focussed 
on that issue in a paper Dostojewski a zachodnia wyobraźnia religijna included 
in the Ziemia Ulro collection. There, he presented Dostoevsky as a prophet, who 
foretold the deviation of freedom as a result of the capturing of minds with false 
notions. That prophet of the time of contempt considered the idea of elevating 
man to replace God as the most dangerous of all. miłosz stressed that for the 
great Russian writer, it had been a spew of the mad path of humanity, i.e. the dif-
fusion throughout Europe of the Enlightenment idea of human self-affirmation of 
naturally good man. He noted in an essay entitled Legenda wyspy that the Rous-
seauistic idea of good will and the naturally good man became the foundation the 
anthropology of Auschwitz. That served as the foundation for the development 
 12 Ibid., p. 42.
 13 Ibid., p. 50.
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of the idea of anthropotheism defined by Ludwig Feuerbach in The Lectures on 
the Essence of Religion, which gave man Godly prerogatives. As a result, Chris-
tian eschatology was replaced by secular eschatology, i.e. socialist and national-
istic projects for building heaven on earth. That was why both for Berdyaev and 
miłosz The Grand Inquisitor in The Brothers Karamazov was a brilliant work. 
miłosz’s statements on the legend collected in the volume Rosja. Widzenia trans-
oceaniczne14 indicated the influence of Berdyaev on the mind of the Polish poet. 
The legend… was also for him a prophetic foreshadowing of the delivering to the 
emperor that which is the emperor’s and that which is god’s. It was a prophecy on 
the human abandonment of freedom for the certainty of earthly joy. It foreshad-
owed ideological “New Faiths.” It prophesied an escape from freedom towards 
fanaticism triggered by the notions of a glorious worldly future.
According to miłosz, Darwinism became the breeding ground for those no-
tions, while fanaticism was a result of considering the findings of Darwinism as 
universal – binding both in the natural world and in human communities. Con-
sidering them as binding within history implied the error of accepting the homo 
homini lapus principle, i.e. the opportunistic affirmation of wolf-like rules of sur-
vival, and, eventually, the admiration of the wilfulness of races exterminating 
other races considered deficient, ergo: unworthy of existence. Freedom at the folly 
of the blind will for power became, according to miłosz, in the German totalitari-
anism a wilfulness for killing, carnage, and extermination. It became the sacred 
will, motivated through eugenics, of the master race, for which it was befitting to 
destroy the useless sub-humans in order to gain Lebensraum (living space).
miłosz found the essence of the distortion of freedom in the German to-
talitarianism in the falseness of the pro naturam self-affirmation. Similarly to 
Dostoevsky, he saw in it the kernel of the dethroning of man-God by God-man, 
who elevated the savagery of human nature to the level of godliness. The time of 
war gave the poet the conviction that an ideology which draws inspiration from 
the spirit of Darwinian principles, i.e. draws its banner from the earth’s Spirit, 
inevitably brings to the world the carnage of the Spirit of history – the spirit of na-
tions and classes. From that stemmed miłosz’s postulate of opening one’s eyes to 
Darwinism so that freedom remained contra naturam – aware of what dark pow-
ers it offers its veto, so that man could fulfil themselves in accordance with their 
controlled nature, while their freedom controlled their personal darkness, not for 
the darkness to rule and destroy their freedom. miłosz’s essay entitled Legenda 
wyspy indicated that Darwinism is necessary in human cognition, so that people 
do not remain in the clutches of earthly powers. The awareness of the power of 
Darwinian laws is necessary to remain independent of them. It facilitates wilful-
 14 Vide: Cz. miłosz, Rosja. Widzenia transoceaniczne, vol. I, Dostojewski – nasz współczesny, 
B. Toruńczyk (ed.), Fundacja „Zeszytów Literackich”, Warsaw 2010.
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ness, as it helps man realise what powers of nature they summon in themselves 
as its part. One such power is the instinctive treatment of space as a realm of 
ideological purity. His war-time essays (Legenda wyspy) proved that it was the 
common unawareness of the immanent nature of the deadly powers of nature and 
human nature that led to the deformations of naturalistic monism in politics. The 
joyful celebrations of the discoveries of the principles of willpower constituted, 
according to miłosz, the culmination of the captivity of the West European mind. 
“It may be the case that that version of life’s devotees proved the most danger-
ous for the West.”15 In that context, he emphasised in his later essays and poems 
Charles Darwin’s objections towards evolutionism as a devilish theory. He argued 
that the biologist realised the world-view dangers of Darwinism. According to 
miłosz, an intellectual aberration impelled millions of Germans to escape from 
freedom to the ideology of the race of a totalitarian state as Nazism appealed to 
their natural drives and instincts. It infested Germans with an affirmation of that 
ideology. It defined for worldly life devotees a goal to capture Lebensraum for 
themselves. Therefore, Nazism turned Germans into the joyful media of dark 
Darwinism. Extreme wilfulness gave them captivity within the thrall of deadly 
laws, to which they became obedient servants as Nazism did not leave them any-
thing with which to defend themselves against the natural rules of selection and 
annihilation. To conclude: the initial assumption of miłosz’s essays was a convic-
tion that freedom cognitively opened to the influence of primitive laws of nature 
shall remain freedom, provided that it is contra naturam in relation to them.
Cultural foundation of Darwinism
miłosz’s war-time essays indicated that German totalitarianism was a wilful-
ness organised against freedom. It was founded in European individualism. The 
degeneration of wilfulness consisted of the mind’s dismissal of moral and rational 
inhibitions under the influence of natural monism. miłosz saw the essence of the 
German scandal in the subjection of politics to emotion, primal inspiration, and 
pagan mythology. He saw the beginning of Nazism in the concept of irrational 
freedom – following intuition, feeling, emotion, and political exaltation. There-
fore, in his war-time essays, miłosz remained disinclined even to Bergson’s in-
tuition as he was convinced that the opening of the will to the suggestions of all 
types of irrationalism opened in Germany the gates for the insane ideology.
The German madness led to a mutation of the urban ethos. By spurning the 
truth, as everyone has such a truth, according to Nietzsche, as they need for their 
 15 Cz. miłosz, Legenda woli…, p. 52.
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life goals, Germans derailed the ethos grounded in the Protestant foundation. 
They chose the banner of science interpreted within the spirit of extermination 
based on the race criterion. According to the essayist, an extreme version of in-
dividualism was the subjection of the will of Germans to the ethos of racial war. 
It required them to sacrifice European rationalism together with Christian tradi-
tions. It was negated through the unification of the Romantic will with Darwin-
ian laws of the survival of the fittest – considered as intelligent. Thus, the god 
of Germans was considered the granter of homicidal laws. Inspired by the laws 
of nature, they grew to believe that He was with them, especially when they were 
killing. The extermination of the weak became for them an experience of freedom 
unified with the laws of god’s nature. miłosz’s analysis indicated that Nazism 
(inspired by Darwinism) elevated killing to the top of religious exaltation. In that 
mental condition, Germans experienced killing as an act of unity with the god of 
nature. An important cause of their mania was the urge to transcend death, as the 
discoverers of Darwinistic revelations deserved, in their eyes, to be the medium 
of god’s laws. Once unified with the immortal god, they fell into a sense of al-
ready sharing immortality here: on Earth. The ethos of extermination proved for 
them an ethos of self-extermination.
Gnostic freedom in the ages of secularisation
miłosz got to know communist totalitarianism by being its proponent. 
Though he rarely returned after WWII to Germans possessed by Nazism, the phe-
nomenon of the fall of freedom into wilfulness of the Eastern type became the 
main focus in his works, and continued to interest him throughout his later life. It 
was expressed most fully during his exile in France and America. Communism, 
similarly to Nazism, was for miłosz a result of secularisation. However, he did no-
tice differences in the process of the secularisation of the Orthodox Church. His 
knowledge of Russia enabled the poet to capture the differences between German 
and Russian wilfulness. Both forms were, in fact, examples of extreme sicknesses 
of freedom, yet their origins had been different. The differences of the religious 
movements had a decisive influence on the differences of the intellectual captivi-
ties in the Nazi and Soviet totalitarianisms.
Dualism remained at the centre of miłosz’s consideration of Eastern free-
dom. He carefully traced Eastern cults as he considered Russians as the succes-
sors of a gnostic and Manichean understanding of good and evil. He argued that 
in gnostic and manichean (Bogomilian) cults, the opposition between the spirit 
and the body, the ideal and reality, and the over-world and the world reached the 
extreme level particular to Russians. He found dualism as a model for analys-
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ing Russian culture in Jasinowski’s work entitled Wschodnie chrześcijaństwo 
a Rosja (1933). That model had already been used by Berdyaev in a work en-
titled Dostoevsky: An Interpretation (1923). Jasinowski, however, in a break-
through discovery, concluded that it was a gnostic-Manichean dualism. Berdy-
aev applied that gnostic-manichean model of dualism to the fullest only in his 
work entitled The Russian Idea (1946). However, he did not quote Jasinowski, 
but Adolf Harnack. In the remarks, he offered a single sentence of commentary 
on the concept of the German religious scholar: “Harnack asserts that there is 
among the Russians a dispisition to marcionism.”16 Berdyaev considered that 
statement to be true. miłosz, being prepared through the lectures of marian 
Zdziechowski, shared the view of Jasinowski, which he considered accurate 
throughout his life. In relation to Russia, he considered as true the statement: 
“an isolated formation of individual consciousness, which displays a character 
formally less concise, and less coherent than in the West (sometimes applicable 
even to the dualistic division), while in terms of its contents, it is transcend-
ently-contemplatively aimed at the after world, and diverted from worldliness, 
which is negatively and pessimistically disposed to socio-political bonds, to 
the entire worldly reality in fact. The gnostic-Manichean dualism of good and 
evil transforms easily into another opposition pair: into the antithesis of the 
individual ‘I’, which adores freedom and is diverted from the earthly and evil 
in its fabric reality, and the reality based on ‘the ruler of this world’, i.e. Satan 
or his state, thus, eventually, in the State of generalness.”17 In cultism, and the 
saturation of the Orthodox Church with dualistic elements, miłosz saw, after 
Jasinowski and Berdyaev, the answer to the question on the origins in the East-
ern mentality of the gap between the zones of earthly necessities and freedoms. 
And why Eastern freedom is implicite anti-worldly. In fact, all agreed that the 
“gnostic-manichean dualism formed as a prelude to the dualism of ideals and 
reality, freedom and compulsion.”18 miłosz shared Jasinowski’s conviction that: 
“One could, in fact, talk about (as German Romantic philosophy did) the antith-
esis of freedom and necessity as the basic stream of general human history,”19 
but he also thought that the dilemma possessed a strictly Slavic nature. In the 
East (the poet was his own example that it applied not only to Russia), freedom 
turned, principally, against the evil world, itself become its own reverse, i.e. 
wilfulness. Justyna Kurczak offered the following summary of the concept of 
the birth of Eastern civic freedom, and Eastern wilfulness in her work entitled 
Wschodnie chrześcijaństwo a Rosja: “While in modern times in Western cul-
ture, there occurred an evolution the axis of which was the liberation of ‘man 
 16 M. Berdyaev, Rosyjska idea…, p. 270. [Berdyaev, m. The Russian Idea. New York 1948].
 17 B. Jasinowski, op. cit., p. 5.
 18 Ibid.
 19 Ibid., p. 7.
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and citizen,’ the emancipation of the individual, in Russian culture there consol-
idated, according to Jasinowski, the gnostic negation of the worldly order by the 
individual, for whom collective life is filled with evil, whereas the perfect order 
can symbolise both the autocrat and the collective. He had a very strong sense 
of the division into the ideal and reality, into the individual absolute freedom 
‘out of this world’ and the acceptance of the society-state reality characterised 
by extreme omnipotence and compulsion.”20
In miłosz’s analyses, as he remained under the influence of Jasinowski, dual-
ism was a model of mental structure, without which it is not possible to explain 
the nihilistic character of Russian freedom. The apocalyptic anti-worldliness of 
the Russian mentality (the religion of dualism) fertilised its nihilism being ex-
pressed in the disdain for nature, for the values of the earthly material and spir-
itual culture, for law and economics, and most of all for morality in politics and 
social life. Nikolai Beryaev, who influenced Jasinowski, found that mental state 
in the following passage of The Diary from the 1840s by Aleksandr Nikitenko: 
“a pathetic sight of our contemporary society. There are neither any lofty pursuits, 
nor lawfulness, simplicity, or fair morals, in short: nothing which would indicate 
a healthy, natural and energetic development of moral forces… The deprivation 
of the society is so high that the notions of honour and justice are considered 
either as weaknesses or a manifestation of Romantic exaltation… Our educa-
tion is pure falseness… Why should we care about gaining knowledge when our 
life and society are hostile towards grand ideas and truths, when any attempts at 
fulfilling any thought of justice, good, and common benefit is met with persecu-
tion and stigmatisation as if they were crimes?”21 As one can see, the systems 
in Russia change, but Russia shall remain the same as long as the state of things 
described by Nikitenko continues. Following Berdyaev, Jasinowski assumed that 
“In public life in Russia, extreme maximalism evokes polar attitudes: rebellious 
or filled with endless humility, verging on self-annihilation.”22 miłosz was discov-
ering that eternal Russia. He discovered its relic religiosity as being constitutive. 
He considered the rule of the tzars and communism as the guises of autocracy. He 
considered the duality of exorbitant intentions, and opposite necessary actions as 
the essence of the Russian mentality, genetically explaining its political fate. The 
chronic conflict between ideas and deeds within the practices of social and politi-
cal life, the illusionary façade nature of the state and its institutions – that is the 
proper social system of Russia, the condition of its fabric, and the actual reality. 
 20 J. Kurczak, “Rosyjski komunizm w perspektywie polskiej myśli filozoficznej”, in: m. Broda, 
J. Kurczak, P. Waingertner, Komunizm w Rosji i jego polskie interpretacje, Wydawnictwo Ibidem, 
Lodz 2006, p. 44. [English version translated from Polish].
 21 As cited in: M. Berdyaev, Rosyjska idea, trans. J.C. – S.W., Stowarzyszenie Kulturalne Fron-
da, Warsaw 1999, p. 78.
 22 J. Kurczak, op. cit., p. 45.
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That mental state is the true enemy of Russians. It builds their self-destructive 
civilisation. Russians, the born anti-worldly dualists, apart from some exceptions 
unaware of the state, build that system together with the authorities.
The model of the dualistic analysis was also considered accurate in the late-
20th c. by Boris Uspensky and Yuri Lotman, within the diagnostics of the states 
of social psychology in Russia, as it explained the etiology of the Russian mental-
ity as gnostic freedom fertilising nihilism described, e.g. by Nikitin. Therefore, 
it is noteworthy that Berdyaev discovered the adequacy of the model under the 
influence of Dostoevsky in the initial decades of the 20th c., when he analysed 
the Russian dualism in relation to the anti-worldly nature of nihilism motivated 
through the will for apocalypse restoring like apocatastasis a different Earth un-
der a different sky: “The antinomous polarity of the Russian soul combines ni-
hilism with religious pursuit of the end of the world, to a new revelation, a new 
Earth, and a new sky. Russian nihilism is polluted with Russian apocalyptics. 
That type of spiritual disposition considerably hinders the work of the nation, the 
creation of the values of culture, and it is not conducive to any spiritual discipline. 
That was the focus of Konstantin Leontiev when he said that a Russian can be 
a saint, but he can never be a man of honour. Honour entails moral mediocrity, 
a bourgeois virtue which is not interesting for apocalypticians and nihilists. That 
quality proved fatal for the Russian nation as saints include only the chosen few, 
while the majority is doomed to a life without sanctity. Only a few achieve the 
higher spiritual life, while the majority of people prove to have a below average 
cultural life.”23
miłosz, following that train of thought on Russia in Native Realm, considered 
the Russians’ approach to truth significant. He noted that the lenient approach to 
facts in social life was characteristic of the Eastern culture. For example, accord-
ing to dualistic convictions, our statements on facts are defective truths. Those 
polluted earthly truths cannot access the Truth: The truth of truths. Alain Be-
sançon noted that in Russia, Pravda signifies not only truth, but also justice and 
obedience towards God, who is the primary source of truth and justice. Istina 
signifies positive actual truth, one which appears in front of one’s eyes, and is 
verifiable. Istina is something less dignified than pravda. The distortions of the 
prophetic truth, istina, are of no major significance as over it there shines pravda 
as the sanctuary. That enables Russians to lie honestly, wholeheartedly (which is 
often noticed by foreigners).”24 The dualism of the earthly istina and the heavenly 
Truth entails the typical Eastern practical conclusion: in everyday life, it is not 
worth pursuing truth as either way it is always only a partial truth, i.e. a partial 
 23 M. Berdyaev, Światopogląd Dostojewskiego…, p. 11.
 24 A. Besançon, Święta Ruś, trans. Ł. maślanka, Fundacja Świętego mikołaja Redakcja „Teolo-
gii Politycznej”, Warsaw 2012, p. 36.
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lie. A lie does not deserve to be condemned as it is necessitated by the earthly 
deficiency. According to miłosz, the fact that Russians abandoned the position of 
seekers of truth is not surprising as it is obvious in earthly reality. It is forced by 
specific existences. Therefore, earthly necessities evoke hatred, but that hatred, 
miłosz continued, constituted only an alibi for nihilism. Precisely that suppressed 
idiosyncrasy is its birthplace. The mother of that nihilism is hatred for the earthly 
deficiency of existence, while its father is the Eastern fatalism which states that 
the world lies in evil. It results in an unlimited tolerance for the necessary evil. 
And thus, miłosz’s analyses uncovered the main conflict of the Russian soul: the 
hate of evil thwarting the adequacy of life, and the admiration of the necessary 
evil, which enables one to nurture that hatred of life and the world. The mainte-
nance of that anti-worldly ambivalence is aided by the opportunistic subjection of 
freedom to the necessities of lies and evil, as those are the necessities of earthly 
life. Only in the Heavenly Kingdom can we stand in truth and goodness, while 
the lamb shall lie aside the lion. Because we live in the earthly hell, any pursuit of 
truth and goodness is insane. Only an idiot can pursue them. The same applies, 
according to Jasinowski, to freedom, equality, fraternity, law, justice, beauty, and 
love. The exorbitant nature of Eastern idealism makes them inaccessible within 
the earthly horizon. After Berdyaev and Jasinowski, miłosz assumed as his own 
a view that “In relation to culture, almost all Russians are nihilists. Culture does 
not solve the problem of the end; emerging from the worldly process, culture 
amplifies mediocrity. Russian boys (Dostoevsky’s favourite expression) focus on 
solving the ultimate problems of the world, the problem of God and immortality, 
or the organisation of humanity according to a new pattern; it appears to atheists, 
socialists, and anarchists as an obstacle in their pursuit of the end of the world. 
Russians contrast the leap towards eschatology with the historic and cultural work 
of the people of Europe. Thus the animosity towards form, the formal principle 
in law, state, morality, art, philosophy, and religion. A Russian is disgusted by 
the formalism of European culture, it is foreign to him. A Russian is only char-
acterised by slight formal skills. Form brings measure, it retains within certain 
limits, it establishes borders, and amplifies within mediocrity. The apocalyptic 
and nihilistic rebellion destroys all forms, cancels all limitations, and drops all 
inhibitions.”25 That explains the Russian passiveness towards worldly matters. In 
miłosz’s analyses, the indolence of Russians towards worldly material and spir-
itual culture had gnostic-Manichean origins, and was related to the anti-worldly 
type of eschatology (apocalyptics according to Berdyaev). Simply the fatalistic 
awareness of earthly necessities justified Russians’ humble enduring captivity, 
inequality, submission, lawlessness, harm, all which is despicable, contempt, and 
hatred, as they stem from innate evil. They are even desired, as they confirm the 
 25 M. Berdyaev, Światopogląd Dostojewskiego…, p. 11.
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manichean position according to which the world lies in evil. That satisfaction, 
justifying fatalism and gnostic freedom, is the essence of the perversion of East-
ern anti-worldliness. The mental dualism enables most Russians to delight in the 
evidence of the futility of rebellion, as the world is not a good place to live in, 
which is why there is no point in regretting the wasting of it. miłosz’s Russians 
delight in anti-worldly inflammation, i.e. rebellious fatalism. When there occurs 
an eruption in the form of a revolution or a war, it is extremely destructive for the 
fundamentally evil world, and, at the same time, it is self-destructive.
After Berdyaev, miłosz identified that Russian ambivalence of the Eastern 
realisation of evil in Dostoevsky: whoever lies, spreads terror, rapes, and kills, 
they sin, but experience the sinfulness of the world and their nature in their own 
experience. Having been afflicted by evil, in decline, one is closer to God. The 
nihilistic freedom of Russians possesses the anti-worldly justification of religious 
gnosis. That is why Russian freedom easily becomes a wilfulness of rejecting 
orthodox norms, social values, collective life norms, and the permanent goods of 
material and spiritual culture. The wantonness of destruction is a manifestation 
of that freedom. The Russian freedom is, according to miłosz, gnostic, i.e. cor-
related with evil. Germans unified in the Darwinism-adoring Nazism, overtly in-
cluded God in their collective. Russian communists officially rejected him, but by 
destroying the world of the Evil, indirectly referred to God, i.e. in the communist 
doctrine and practice there existed a religious dimension of gnosis.
Russian wilfulness laced with gnostic-manichean fatalism strikes the indi-
vidual to the bottom of captivity, yet at the bottom of the totalitarian hell, through 
closeness to Satan, it enables one to recognise God. That was one of the reasons 
why communists severely treated in Gulags usually did not betray or curse Stalin. 
At the foundation of profound fatalism, the wilful cruelty of the authorities also 
appears as their charisma. It enables one to recognise the power of God in their ti-
tanic nature. The cruelty of the Authorities and the subject is, essentially, a meas-
ure of mythical unity. The Russian fatalism, as discussed by miłosz, offered a sa-
cral basis for the unity of the cruel leader, the power institutions of the totalitarian 
state, and the subjects. The traditions of wilfulness produce in Russians a natural 
inclination to submitting to totalitarian systems. In fact, in miłosz’s eyes, the 
model of Russia’s political system was a cult unified in professing the necessity 
of wilful evil. Communist totalitarianism had a legitimacy of cultist mentality. 
Secularisation, as foreseen by Dostoevsky, resulted in Russians taking the apoca-
lypse in their own hands, under the pretext of building a heaven on earth. Their 
freedom degenerating into wilfulness became their hard captivity in the grind 
of life’s necessities of evil. michał Heller and Aleksander Niekricz in a chapter 
entitled Z królestwa konieczności do królestwa wolności (1918–1920), presented 
the Russian revolution as the intelligentsia standing up to the Russian state being 
the “kingdom of necessity.” They presented the revolutionary zeal as a passion for 
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destroying the old order. They saw its motivation in the utopian dream of a “king-
dom of freedom.” They emphasised the prophetic words by Engels that “Nations 
boast of having performed a revolution always discovered too late that they did 
not realise what actually happened. That the revolution which had just occurred, 
was nothing like the revolution its originators desired.”26 Russian researchers 
found the appearance of the “Spirit of destruction” – the wantonness of war-time 
terror – most unexpected.
Dostoevsky on freedom
miłosz’s remarks regarding freedom included Dostoevsky’s main division. 
According to the latter, Western self-affirmation is Pelagianistic. By rejecting the 
evil of human nature, Pelagianism made man blind to personal evil. man, unable 
to perceive his own original evil (the evil of human nature) is devoid of self-
criticism. His self-affirmation is selfish, it is basically a form of adoring one’s 
naturally good self. Due to a lack of self-criticism, one does not see that the affir-
mation world-view is, in essence, a rejection of the consideration of selfishness as 
sinful. Such men make evil as a bee makes honey, yet cannot see it in themselves. 
Therefore, the strategy of self-affirmation is a form of cognitive indolence. man’s 
establishing himself in the moral comfort of good disposition entails the price 
in the impairment which excludes any actual self-assessment. Self-affirmation is 
a form of utopia. A utopian is happy, yet their pragmatic episteme keeps them in 
a cloud of illusion.
Eastern self-affirmation, contrary to its Western counterpart, does not cher-
ish nature and man as its part. On the contrary, it is an anti-worldly affirmation, 
a recognition of despising nature as it views the body and matter as devilish. 
According to miłosz, rebellion against the world in the name of discovered laws 
of nature is different from a rebellion against the world as it is, because it cannot 
include an order which could be recognised. Therefore, the only thing which can 
be recognised is destruction. The Russian self-affirmation derives from a con-
testation of the laws of nature. Gnostic contestation, by transitioning into its op-
posite, is the reason why a Russian eventually affirms himself as an adorer and 
originator of life’s evil. Thus, the self-affirmation spreads to personal evil, and it 
also affirms the evil of this world. miłosz’s Russians take pride in their readiness 
to oust the earthly oppressions of life, yet, forced to act within the earthly reality, 
they also take pride in their cruelty, aware of the necessity. That mental affliction, 
 26 m. Heller, A. Niekricz, Utopia u władzy. Historia Związku Radzieckiego od narodzin do 
wielkości 1917–1939, trans. A. mietkowski, Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, Poznan 2016, pp. 85–86.
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according to Justyna Kurczak, was seized upon by Jasinowski: “The principle: all 
or nothing, valid in Russia, precludes any consensual attitudes and evaluations, 
and actually leads to negating reality.”27
In the age of secularisation, Russian dualists adore the opposition of the this 
and that world. They absolve their notthisness (rejection of the world) in the name 
of self-redemption through destroying the old order. By reducing the world to the 
tabula rasa condition. Therefore, one could note that the German destructive-
ness was pro-worldly in the sense that it was laced with trust in this world – how 
dysfunctional and self-destructive the New Faith was is a different matter. The 
Russian destructiveness, then, was essentially anti-worldly, as it was the eruption 
of the power of anti-worldly dualism accumulated on the basis of cultist religios-
ity. The peak in the development of both totalitarianisms was the establishment of 
the God-man: the builder of the system of extermination and self-extermination.
Remarks on freedom
The experience of two totalitarianisms helped miłosz recognise that free-
dom is opus contra naturam. It opposes ideologies inspired by Darwinism. An-
thropocentrism, or anthropocentrism emulating the man-God model, removes 
the temptation to flee from freedom into the ideology of extermination and self-
extermination, into the structures of a state organising the unifying rituals of 
death. On the other hand, freedom, unwilling to succumb to the laws of dark Dar-
winism, cannot succumb to the temptation of gnostic-manichean escapism as its 
anti-worldliness leads to wilful destruction of the completely evil world. Through 
the indolence in the act of making earth subject, the freedom simply changes into 
killing wilfulness. Rebellious against the evil world, against the thrall of natural 
laws, it itself becomes the medium of wilful evil, and in turn falls into limitless 
captivity.
The tragedy of freedom in the era of secularisation recorded in miłosz’s es-
says consisted of placing it within the field of binary stress between the extreme 
of Nazist wilfulness and the extreme of communist wilfulness. Having been de-
prived of the foundation of religion, it became lost in New Faiths. It became lost in 
ideology on the basis of naturalist monism or on the basis of a radical dualism of 
cultist provenance as “The religious roots of Russian maximalism do not prevent 
it from becoming the carrier of secular utopia.”28 Those extremes were its Scylla 
and Charybdis. The Charybdis of freedom is to make nature and its laws an oracle 
 27 J. Kurczak, op. cit., p. 45.
 28 Ibid.
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offering sufficient guidelines for the human world. That freedom leads to absorp-
tion of the transcendent dimension by the immanence – until losing the model of 
God-humanity. On the other hand, freedom led astray within cultist transcend-
ence becomes lost in disdain for demiurgic immanence. Once secularised, it holds 
the world in disdain. That is the Scylla of wilfulness – of escapism ( from) or a de-
structive turn against immanence (to). The essence of the derailing of European 
freedom is the escape into the structure of a totalitarian state motivated with hard-
line will of its racial redemption or the will for destructive redemption from the 
evil world fulfilled under the pretext of ensuring the happiness of a chosen class.
Nazism and communism taught miłosz that freedom is the tragedy of con-
tradictions. Its dynamics create internal opposition. It is possible when man as the 
opus contra naturam fulfils himself exactly through those pro naturam values. 
That is its coincidentia oppositorum. In other words: a free person is that who el-
evates their humanity above Darwinist nature, and from the position of that trans-
gression turns towards the world to, within the corporal and material framework 
of specific existences, anthropocentrically transform that world or transform it 
anthrocentrically based on the man-God model. Berdyaev read from Dostoevsky 
that “man exists thanks to a higher nature than his nature.”29 miłosz did not re-
ject secular humanism, though he often expressed doubts whether it is possible to 
use it as the basis for freedom in the age of totalitarian faiths. His anthropocen-
trism was Christian, and yet open to non-orthodox visions placing man within the 
centre of the cosmos: for example Adam Kadmon from cabala.
Stone-solid world of scientism
During the American period, miłosz called the world of physical-biological 
necessities the land of Ulro. In Vision from San Francisco Bay, he concluded that 
reality will increasingly often appear as a system of necessities. He anticipated 
an areligiously or religiously motivated contestation of its stone-solid laws. That 
meant humanity’s past entering the ruts of neo-manicheistic anti-worldliness. 
Freedom remained threatened by the temptations of destructive wilfulness. Due 
to the progress of scientism, it is difficult to breach the stone-solid firmament 
of the world. In The Land of Ulro, he argued that it would be the transcendent 
development of the scientific image of the world, i.e. a combination of the deep 
image of the cosmos of modern astrophysics, and the evolutionism with the reli-
gious visions of creationism or a religious syncretism which would consider the 
visions of gnostic-manichean religion. That was the way for freedom to escape 
 29 M. Berdyaev, Światopogląd Dostojewskiego…, p. 42.
 Totalitarianisms as systems of lawlessness (miłosz’s remarks) 135
the prison of the Euclidean mind. According to Berdyaev, Dostoevsky considered 
that scientistic mind of three physical dimensions as “detached from the eternal 
Meaning”,30 and unable to grasp the irrational mystery of freedom of falling into 
the evil of wilfulness. Due to that mind “it is not possible to accept God who cre-
ated so terrifying, and horrible a world.”31
In miłosz’s notion of freedom, its openness to infinity is irreducible. Accord-
ing to the author of The Land of Ulro, the world of physics, devoid of a window 
onto the metaphysical dimension, is for freedom a hell of submission within the 
mathematical shackles of the laws of matter. That leads to metaphysical disin-
heritance and closing in immanence. That applies to opening Infinity for free-
dom, where the former does not bear any anti-worldly dualism, but rather inspires 
the affirmation of the world. Within the penal system of the mind of rationalism 
and empiricism, the religion of God-humanity is the gateway to freedom, which 
is not subject to determinism. It negates the stone-solid heaven. miłosz, certain 
of historic irrationalism, was inclined towards its metaphysical form. That ir-
rationalism of faith in a miracle was the only way to break away from the block 
of determinism. In that sense, the necessities of faith as freedom in Ulro. The 
Man-God model transcends the reductionism characteristic of naturalistic mon-
ism, and negates the sense in redeeming oneself from the world through escapism 
or destruction. It is a model of freedom verified through the ability to redeem the 
world, not of escapist redemption from the oppression of earthly life. The mature 
miłosz was convinced that a remedy for the madness of wilfulness inspired by 
the Spirit of the earth, and by the Spirit of anti-worldly dualism is the acceptance 
of the beauty of Creation, at the same time opposing its dark cruelty. The price 
of freedom is the need to tolerate the contradictory state of admiring the beauty 
of the world in combination with sympathy for the pain immanently present in it.
Freedom and demise
Being influenced by Dostoevsky, miłosz argued that in a world which does 
not wish to be totalitarian, there should be a place for the demise of wilfulness, as 
without the possibility of freedom deteriorating into wilfulness, there emerges an 
order of violence. miłosz assumed as his own a statement by Berdyaev reading 
Dostoevsky: “man feels an indestructible need for irrationality, mad freedom, 
and suffering. man, contrary to common belief, does not pursue comfort. In his 
wilfulness, man prefers suffering. He opposes the rational order of life. Freedom 
 30 Vide: M. Berdyaev, Światopogląd Dostojewskiego…, p. 11.
 31 Ibid.
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is not, however, the rule of mind over the impulses of soul, freedom itself is irra-
tional and insane, and it leads to breaking the lines set forth for man. That type of 
endless freedom tires man, and leads to his ruin. Yet man values that torment and 
that ruin… which leads man to the final limits of bifurcation.”32 That applies to 
the bifurcation into the zone of necessities which reality demands to be respected, 
and the anti-worldly wilfulness. The analysis of Notes from Underground led 
miłosz to the conclusion that the order of totalitarian captivity is entrenched when 
it deprives an individual of the ability to choose the chaos of wilfulness. That 
condition changes man into a cog within a machine regulated through violence. 
miłosz assumed Berdyaev’s reading based on which “Dostoevsky recognised the 
polarity of the divine and devilish principles, the violent clash of light and dark-
ness within the depths of being.” He knew that “God and the devil fight deep 
inside the human spirit. Evil has a spiritual nature. The battlefield between God 
and the devil remains deep inside human nature.”33 The social system which con-
siders the demise of freedom into wilfulness respects the ontic foundation of the 
world, i.e. the fact of “a violent clash of light and darkness within the depths of 
being.”34 He gives man the right to choose: “man’s path leads either to God-man 
and within that path man finds his ruin, or to man-God and within that path finds 
his redemption and the final development of his personality”35 through the free-
dom of experience, “in which upon immersing in darkness, new light appears”36 
as “The experience of evil can enrich human personality. However, it should be 
understood in the following manner. The enriching factor is not as much evil it-
self as that spiritual power which awakes to overcome evil.”37 miłosz, who wrote 
“What comes from my evil – that only is true,”38 agreeing with Ryszard Przybyl-
ski, stressed that the possibility of choosing between good and evil is according to 
Dostoevsky the limit of Christian freedom. Since God and the devil fight within 
man’s soul, that means that the pre-fabric of human existence is psychomachia. 
Psychomachia permits the victory of the devil, the demise of freedom into wilful-
ness. A system which excludes the fallen is totalitarian because it does not permit 
psychomachia, because without permitting psychomachia ex definitione it de-
stroys freedom. Berdyaev and miłosz read in Dostoevsky that “man ought to pass 
through freedom”39 though “its path runs through darkness, through void, through 
bifurcation, and through tragedy. (…) That is where man errs being tempted by 
 32 Ibid., p. 28.
 33 Ibid., p. 32.
 34 Ibid.
 35 Ibid., p. 31.
 36 Ibid., p. 34.
 37 M. Berdyaev, Rosyjska idea…, p. 132.
 38 Cz. miłosz, “The master”, in idem, Selected Poems, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Krakow 1996, 
p. 148. 
 39 M. Berdyaev, Światopogląd Dostojewskiego…, p. 11.
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illusionary promises, false light which leads to even greater darkness. (…) That 
is the path of experience, a fiery path, a path of experimental cognition of good 
and evil.”40 Of course, leaving space for wilfulness did not mean lawlessness in 
Dostoevsky or miłosz. Lawlessness which destroys responsibility is the enemy of 
freedom. man has the right to experience demise, but not without consequences.
miłosz argued that man will achieve through his development coniunctio op-
positorum, will become as opus contra naturam: pro naturam, his freedom will 
be saved.
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Zbigniew Kaźmierczyk
Totalitarianisms as systems of lawlessness (Miłosz’s remarks)
(Summary)
The article accounts for the gnostic individualism in miłosz’s records. It shows that its es-
sence is not freedom, but self-will. It argues that its premises are existential. Among them we can 
find the fundamental data of existence: the passage of time, death, growing old of the body, the 
decomposition of matter, experiencing biological drives as violence and the laws of nature and 
history as necessity. If existence is experienced that way it bears self-will. The author argues that 
miłosz fell into a crisis of gnostic self-will as he realized it leads to the inner split between the evil 
world and the ideal super-world. He was also aware that this duality implies the aversion to the 
earthly life and nihilism.
The author shows that the experience of self-will served as a tool in the Nobel laureate’s writ-
ings to study totalitarianisms. From this perspective Nazism seems to be the self-will inspired by 
Darwinism, while Communism – the quintessence of Enlightenment idealism. As a result of the 
deviation of freedom the Nazi Germany and the Bolshevik Russia became the mine of genocide.
Keywords: humanism, Darwinism, freedom and necessity, self-will, totalitarianism, geno-
cide
